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NOTES AND COMMENT
Automobiles; Liability of Driver to Gratuitous Guest; Degree of
Care; Assumption of Risk
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Krueger v. Krueger, 222 N.W.
784 has unequivocally applied the doctrine of assumption of risk, as expressed in Olson v. Hermanson1 to the gratuitous guest in an automobile who brings an action for damage for personal injury against the
driver, and the definition of the degree of care required to be exercised
by the driver as stated in Cleary v. Eckhart.2
The rules of law, as stated in these cases, restrict recovery of damages for personal injury to a gratuitous guest in an automobile to cases
where the driver has not exercised ordinary care not to increase the
danger assumed by the guest when he entered the car, or not to create
a new danger that the guest did not assume, or there exists in the car
a "trap" known to the driver of which he does not warn his guest.'
When the guest enters the automobile he assumes all danger that may
4
inhere in the car and the driver, subject to the above limitations.
The pertinent facts in Krueger v. Krueger are: The plaintiff, mother
of the defendant, wishes to consult a doctor three hundred miles away.
The defendant, owner of a second hand automobile, offers to take her
there for that purpose and as a pleasure trip. They are accompanied
by another son of the plaintiff and two other women. The party
started home at noon, expecting to arrive late that night. The automobile broke down after dark; they were unable to make repairs, so
the party spent the night in the car. The repairs were made in the
morning and the party continued the journey home. While driving at
fifteen miles an hour the defendant found himself dozing, but he did
not mention it to anyone although he lost control of the car for an
instant. A few minutes later he fell asleep; the automobile went into
a ditch and the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff and most of the
occupants of the car were asleep at the time of the accident. The defendant paid the automobile expenses on the trip.
The court, in the opinion, pointed out that the plaintiff was the defendant's guest and as such took the car and the driver as they were;
that, as she knew all the circumstances of the trip, she was bound to
know as a matter of common knowledge that a result such as did follow was reasonably to be expected.
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The court ruled that: "Under such a situation, it must be held as a
matter of law that the plaintiff assumed the risk incident to the entire
situation; there being no showing upon which it could be said that the
defendant failed to exercise ordinary care not to increase the danger
or to create a new danger. The plaintiff, therefore failed to prove a
cause of action for actionable negligence."
The law in Wisconsin, governing the liability of the driver of an
automobile to a gratuitous guest has been clearly defined in recent
decisions of the Supreme Court. The question first came to the attention of the court in O'Shea v. Lavoy,5 but the only point necessary to
decide that case involved the liability of the driver for the condition
of the automobile. The court cited a New York case 6 involving a
horse drawn vehicle, and a Wisconsin case' which discussed the liability
of a host to his guest for the condition of his premises. It held "that
the host was not liable for injuries resulting from a defect in an auto"mobile of which he had no notice"; that the guest accepted the premises of the host as he found them, subject to the limitation that "the
licensor must not set a trap or be guilty of active negligence which contributed to the injury." The court defined a trap as "a hidden danger
lurking upon the premises which may be avoided if known." What
would constitute a trap in an automobile would be a subject for interesting and probably futile speculation. Perhaps a defective catch on a
coach door, known to the driver but of which he neglects to warn his
guest with the result that the door opens and the guest falls out as the
driver turns a corner, would constitute a trap within the meaning of the
definition.
In 4itchell v. Raymond" the court stated the rule that: "as to a
gratuitous guest in a vehicle on a public highway, the owner or driver
of such vehicle owes to such guest the duty of exercising ordinary care
to avoid personal injury to him, and for breach of such duty and consequent injury the host can be held for the resulting damages." In
Cleary v. Eckhart9 the court modified the above rule to read: "As to
the gratuitous guest in a vehicle on a public highway, the owner or
driver of such vehicle owes to such guest the duty of exercising ordinary care not to increase the danger to the guest or to create a new
danger."
. It is in Cleary v. Eckhart that the court first mentions assumption
of risk as a defense in such an action, except as applied to the condi175 Wis. 456.
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tion of the vehicle in O'Shea v. Lavoy, but it is in Krause v. Hall10
that the doctrine is first advanced as a defense. In this case the court
held that a girl, returning from a dance with an escort with whom she
had previously attended dances under similar circumstances, had assumed such risks as were attendant on his drinking moderately, driving
with one hand, kissing and caressing her, but that she had not assumed
the risk attendant on his driving at an excessive rate of speed with his
attention distracted as indicated above, as he had never so driven before when she was with him, and, as she protested against the excessive
speed, she was permitted to recover for injuries sustained when the
automobile hit a train. The court considered the excessive speed as
the sole proximate cause of the injury.
The defense was successfully used in Olson v. Hermanson." In
the opinion the court said: "Under these facts, it would seem that it
was immaterial whether Mrs. Hermanson was driving thirty or thirtyfive or forty miles an hour. She was driving at her usual and customary rate of speed," with which her guests were familiar, and when
they accepted her hospitability "they accepted whatever risk attended
the degree of proficiency Mrs. Hermanson had acquired as a driver,
and her usual and customary habits of driving, with which they were
familiar." At the time this case arose the lawful rate of speed was
thirty miles an hour. The argument was also advanced that Mrs. Hermanson was driving faster than usual, but the court held that if she
was driving faster than usual it was by the acquiescence of all het
guests.
From the cases considered it seems that the guest cannot assume
that either the car or the driver will conform to the law; that if the
guest knows or should know that the driver is not in physical condition to drive, that he lacks skill and proficiency, is reckless, or habitually violates the law and accepts an invitation to ride he assumes
all risks incident to the position in which he voluntarily places himself.
He also assumes all risk incident to the condition of the car as a safe
vehicle to operate, being entitled only to that degree of safety that the
host enjoys; i.e., he is entitled to be warned of such hidden dangers
lurking in the vehicle as the driver has knowledge of, that he may have
an equal opportunity to avoid them.
Assumption of risk as used in these cases is a form of contributory
negligence. 12 With this in mind a quotation from a Connecticut case is
pertinent.13
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If the claim of the defendant, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in accepting the invitation to ride, was sustained, we
would have this illogical result. A driver of an automobile, by constantly displaying his incompetency in driving, would be likely to create
such a state of mind in persons invited to ride with him that the drivers
liability for negligent driving in a specific accident would ordinarily be
deemed not actionable because of the contributory negligence of any
one accepting an invitation to ride with him with knowledge of his
incompetence.
A reasonable answer to the above would be that if he does not wish
to assume a risk that he is well aware of, he is free to decline the invitation.

ALEx WILMER

Carrier; Agent; Scope of Authority; Bills of Lading
Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 49 Supreme" Court Reporter
I61 : in this carrier's case the decision was "railroad held liable for loss
resulting from forgery of bill of lading by its employee."
McDonnell, an employee of the railroad company whose duty it was
to give notice to consignee upon the receipt of cotton, forged the bill of
lading and notified the plaintiff that his goods had arrived. Gleason
assuming the notice to be genuine paid the draft attached to the bill
of lading for the sum of $io,ooo. The false statements were made to
effect a fradulent design for the employee's personal benefit.
The court instructed the jury to find for the petitioner if the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. Judgment was
rendered for the plaintiff, but upon appeal was reversed on the theory
that an employer was not liable, "for the false statements of an agent
made solely to effect a fraudulent design for his own benefit and not
in behalf of the employer or his business."
The court based its decision on Friedlanderv. Texas & Pacific Ry.
Co., 130 U. S. 416, where it was held that the agent was acting outside the scope of his employment in issuing bills of lading before the
arrival of goods and the employer was liable neither in contract nor in
tort.
The above rule has been altered by a modification of the Federal
Bills of Lading Act, Sec. 22. It enlarged the agent's implied authority
by imposing a new liability on the principal for the agent's act in issuing the bill even though the merchandise was not received.
This case' did not rest upon the agent's authority to issue -bills, but
upon his authority to notify the petitioner upon the arrival or nonarrival of goods which he clearly did not have.
The court reversed the previous order on the grounds that it was
not the intent of Congress to establish a general rule of liability in
other classes of cases not involving bills of lading. BERT J. LANDREE

' Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 49 Supreme Court Reporter I61.

